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Iraqi-American Fawaz Saraf emails these insights:
A very important point and unfortunately this point seems to get lost while reporting on Iraq: A large segment of Iraqi society (80% of Iraqis who are either Kurds or Shiites) either oppose or are actively fighting against the insurgency. It is probably accurate to state that support for the insurgency among the Sunni population of Anbar and Salah el-din provinces varies between active support to passive sympathy and it is probably a mistake to assume that there is widespread support for the insurgency among the Sunni population in other provinces. I hope that in our effort to appease the Sunni Arabs and the insurgency, we do not alienate the majority of the population.
Saraf is also the author of this paper, which proposes that Iraqi oil revenue be distributed directly to Iraqi civilians. Surprisingly, there is precedent for this in Alaska:
This is certainly not a new concept for managing the natural resources of a country. Nearly every Alaska resident received $1,017 check in 2003 as their share of the state's oil riches (a $433 drop from last year's payout and an $857 decrease from the all-time high of $1,964 in 2000). The dividend checks are distributed every year from an oil royalty account called the Alaska Permanent Fund, created in 1976 after oil was discovered on the North Slope; almost 600,000 people received a dividend in 2003.
Saraf has recently been in Iraq, where he is working on reconstruction. In this interview he describes some of what he learned about how Hussein had run the country:
"The first thing you notice is the huge numbers of palaces and monuments to Saddam Hussein. They are truly incredible, and that is what stands out," he said. "Then, you have areas that have suffered decades of neglect and diverted funds. You have five, six or seven families living in one house, which of course leads to all kinds of social problems. You see sewage running down the middle of the street."
As a bridge engineer, Saraf was also appalled at the lack of money spent on infrastructure. For example, instead of fixing a bombed four-lane bridge in the southern part of the country, the regime installed a one-lane pontoon bridge as punishment to people of that region. It has to be repaired about once a month.
"This is the case all over the country," Saraf said. "The bare minimum is spent. Trestle or pontoon bridges that are hard to use and in disrepair are everywhere. I'm a road and bridge person, but our first priority was housing."
.."It was hard to come back to America because of all the good we were doing in Iraq," Saraf said. "The Iraqis had no fuel, no electricity and there was rioting in the streets. But it is still better for them than before.
As a taxi driver put it, "I would rather take this for the next five years than live under Saddam."
In early July, when I first recommended deporting Islamofascists, it was considered an unusual suggestion. Now, just over a month later, it's already become the official policy of France (started by deporting 12) and England (announced an open-ended policy to deport supporters of terrorism).
Now Italy has gone still better:
Italy, the subject of several Internet threats from purported Islamic militant groups, said it had begun expulsion procedures against 701 people.
Note two things. First, the number of terrorist supporters specified: 701 -- making France and England look like beginners. Second, the type of procedure -- not deportation -- but expulsion. Deportation often implies that the individual will be sent to a specified receiving country. Expulsion, on the other hand, just means the individual will be driven out, and it's up to that person to find a country to go to.
There is little doubt that the community in Italy that gives birth -- in every sense -- to new terrorists, is realizing that for the first time, doing so results in danger, not just to the suckers who are fooled into becoming terrorists -- but also, to the larger community that has produced them. The store owners and customers who like to go about their daily business while cheering for Islamofascism are now realizing that it's no longer a joke, but that they themselves are now in danger as well. This is likely to reduce the number of new terrorists produced by that community.
Update 8-17-05: The Reuters link for the article seems to be expired. Here's a link to a similar report.