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A September 25th article on this site began as follows:
In a post on August 17th, I examined why Condi and the GWB administration supported an end to the Israel-Hezbollah war via U.N. resolution 1701, which relied on U.N. security forces.
U.N. Resolution 1701 on the Israel-Hezbollah war was passed less than a week ago, and already no one can tell why the U.S. supported it, or what good we thought it was supposed to do. The resolution leaves it up to Lebanon to enforce its provisions against Hezbollah, and as of today:
I started with Condi's stated goal of preventing a return to what the status quo was before the war:
"We do seek an end to the current violence, we seek it urgently. We also seek to address the root causes of that violence," she said. "A cease-fire would be a false promise if it simply returns us to the status quo."
My conclusion, which seemed surprising to me at the time, was that Condi actually believed it was possible to accomplish something useful via the U.N., given the active support and participation of the Lebanese government:
...GWB and Condi seem to think Lebanon really is going to disarm Hezbollah. Where they're getting this from, I have no idea, but it's evident they haven't given up on it yet.
Second, GWB and Condi have decided to trade the possibility of an imminent outright destruction of Hezbollah by Israel, for specific advances in the official stance of the U.N. vis-a-vis Hezbollah. They actually believe that the threat of U.N. resolutions and sanctions will make it difficult for Iran and Syria to provide arms to Hezbollah. They're essentially hoping for long-term peer pressure, over a period of years, to take the place of an immediate victory on the ground, which they felt presented too great a danger of initiating a larger war.
The September 25th article examined the latest developments in Lebanon, and found that at that point things were going well for the GWB/Condi plan there.
The latest developments, however, indicate that the plan, of relying on the Lebanese government plus the U.N. to control Hezbollah, does not appear to have been correct:
Hezbollah Plans Overthrow of Lebanon Government
LEBANON: HEZBOLLAH ANNOUNCES 'SURPRISE ACTS' AGAINST GOVERNMENT
Iran reportedly smuggling arms to Hezbollah via Syria
Last week I had the opportunity to meet and speak to Yossi Olmert, the brother of Israeli PM Ehud Olmert. Yossi noted that pressure from Condi was key to Israel's decision to end the Israel-Hezbollah war when it did. Given the latest developments, it seems that it was incorrect for Condi to pressure Israel into halting its war against Hezbollah at that time, as well as to rely on the U.N. plus the Lebanese government to control Hezbollah.
I believe Condi was trying to do the most responsible thing, and to find a way to resolve the situation without war. If her strategy works, and Hezbollah is put down, it will be important to recognize it and applaud her.
But Hezbollah wants to destroy the government in Lebanon. Talking to them isn't going to change their views. Their methods are violent, and defeating them is likely to require force. So far, the combination of the Lebanese government and the U.N., has not applied sufficient force, and has not found any successful alternative approach, to achieve the goal of controlling Hezbollah.