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Daniel Pipes.
(This is the third in a series on the international conference on the Collapse of Europe, organized by Avi Davis of the American Freedom Alliance, and the Council for Democracy and Tolerance, at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. The first two articles are here: first article - second article.)
At 3pm there was a second panel in the main auditorium for all attendees. At this panel, Daniel Pipes made what appears to me to have been one of the most profound observations of the Conference. He began with an overview of the history of Europe over the last hundred years:
Europe in the 19th century was a confident continent. It was successful and it knew it - whether in terms of political achievement, cultural achievement, scientific, engineering achievement - power projection - Europe until 1914 - what we call 19th century Europe, was superior to any other part of the world. It's achievements stood out. And indeed had been standing out, for four centuries. Europeans entered into world war I with a great deal of enthusiasm - what's been called a delirium of enthusiasm. It had been a century since there had been a major war - the Napoleonic wars. There had been the buildup of the philosophical base - let me just mention the name of Frederic Nietzsche - that found war to be romantic and attractive. And so Europeans went to war in 1914 in this delirium of enthusiam. And of course, four years later, they came out of it devastated and horrified - and came to the conclusion, never again would they engage in such a war. They would avoid war - they would do whatever it took to avoid such a war. In the 1930s we saw that policy in action, in particular by the british and french governments, as they sought to avoid war - what we call, 'appeasement.'
Well, that didn't work either, did it? And the consensus, the second consensus, was, as we faced, as the Europeans faced the Soviet threat, was that they would not appease. No more Munichs. The lesson had been learned. And that remained in place roughly through the Cold War. And - grant me a lot of generalization here, please - there were a lot of exceptions - but, overall, it was maintained through the 40 years plus of the Cold War.
But with the ending of the Cold War, in about 1990, what I think one sees, is a reversion, to the earlier consensus. In other words, the no more Munichs idea, that held through the Cold War, has evaporated [inaudible], taking 20 years. And instead what one sees is a reversion to that earlier, post-World War I consensus. In other word, we've lived our lives in the post-World War II era, but it is, before our eyes, in Europe, turning into a post-World War I era. As David Galenter of Yale University puts it, it's the 1920s all over again.
Pipes continued:
...France is a particularly interesting case, because France is, like the United States, a country that is - an idea. We're not related to each other, we don't have a history that goes back together, but we, in one fashion or another, found ourselves in this country, and we're in pursuit of happiness here. The French have liberte, equalite and fraternite. But no other countries have, at least in Europe and North America, have an idea. Not Canada - certainly not the other countries of Europe. And what they find, is particular difficulty in explaining who they are. And as their civilizations are now challenged from the inside, by a substantial and growing population, that says, 'we have something better - we have Islamism, which beats what you have' - the European peoples are finding it very difficult to come up with a response and say, 'no no, what we have is good.' And what one finds is rather pathetic. For example, the famous Dutch film, that shows the Dutch values to be shown to potential immigrants, that shows a topless woman in the surf, or two men kissing - is this really what Dutch culture is? Or, less humorous but also somewhat pathetic, is a website put up by the British government, called "Icons - a Portrait of England," which has some hundred or so, very specifically British things. Sherlock Holmes - Westminster Abbey - certain foods and the like. Just this week the incoming Prime Minister has suggested "Britain Day," to celebrate being British. Nobody quite knows what it means. [Amused laughter].
So both for historical reasons, having to do with the 20th century, and historical reasons having to do with the fact that most of Europe is made up of countries that are one large family - that have a certain set of customs, of language, foods, songs, and so forth - but are difficult to turn into an abstraction, and say, 'no - our civilization is something worth preserving.' And for all these reasons I think yes, there is a collapse of confidence. And while I don't think for sure that it's permanent - and there could well be a revival - at this point I think we're seeing a lowpoint - it could go lower - but cerrtainly a lowpoint in European confidence, and something that really is without precedent. I don't know of any historical phenomenon akin to what the Europeans have gone through in the last century.
In other words, in the United States, we have a goal: the pursuit of happiness. And it's a goal we all believe in as a nation. It's a goal worth defending, a way of life worth fighting for. It shows us why what we have is better than what the Islamists offer, because the goal of the Islamists is to destroy freedom, to destroy equality of the sexes, to destroy free speech - and to accomplish nothing more than to require that all others also join their effort to destroy their own freedoms, and the freedoms of others.
As soon as Pipes said it I knew I'd heard something tremendously significant.
The Europeans can benefit from Pipes' insight by considering what their national goals can be.
